事件从哪里开始
近日，重庆长江国际办公大楼楼下发生了一件颇为超现实的事情。如果你对粉丝文化一无所知，那么我们先来简单介绍一下背景。长江国际一直是TF娱乐旗下偶像练习生们来来往往、接受训练的地方。TFBOYS 和 Teens in Times都是这家公司一手打造的，所以多年来一直有人在公司大楼外露营拍照，等待偶像出现。但最近，这里发生了一件大事。一边是大量女性偶像粉丝，另一边是一些男性直播主播和围观者，双方发生争执，后来甚至出现了泼水追逐和其他肢体冲突。
Where the Story Begins
Recently, at Chongqing’s Changjiang International office building something rather surreal happened downstairs. If you know absolutely nothing about fan culture then let’s first briefly explain the background. Changjiang International has long been where idol trainees under TF Entertainment come and go and receive training. TFBOYS and Teens in Times were both created by this company so people have been camping outside the building for years taking photos and waiting for idols. But recently, something big happened here. On one side were large numbers of female idol fans and on the other were some male livestreamers and onlookers the two sides argued, and later there was even water-throwing chasing, and other physical clashes.
8月20日，重庆南安警方发表官方声明，证实8月17日晚有人在此聚集争吵，随后TF娱乐暂停了其在长江国际的练习生集中训练。至于网上关于谁挑起争端以及有多少主播专门来挑衅的说法。有很多不同的版本，至于哪一方是对的还是错的，现在很难说。球迷站队、互相争斗并不罕见。 这件事最离奇的地方在于，这场争执并非发生在两群偶像粉丝之间。相当一部分卷入其中的男性原本就不是这些男偶像的粉丝。
他们为什么会来？一个非常简单的解释是，这起事件吸引了交通流量。 你走进一群女粉丝中间，故意喊出她们讨厌的梗，然后拍摄并嘲笑她们。当然，女粉丝们会奋起反击。反应越激烈，直播就越精彩；直播越精彩，观看的人就越多；观看的人越多，涌入的人也就越多。于是，一栋普通的办公楼楼下，突然变成了一个巨大的真人秀拍摄现场。我们其实以前多次见过这种机制。例如，著名脱口秀演员杨力的一句台词是“为什么他看起来很普通，却感觉很自信？”一段脱口秀表演中的一个笑话最终演变成一场网络性别战争、品牌争议，甚至引发了抵制运动。
为什么如今在中国，男女之间已经积累了如此多的火药，以至于只需要一根丝带就能点燃一根火柴，然后整个世界就会燃烧起来？ 如果你在网上搜索答案，它可能看起来非常简单。 一方认为这是因为中国男人都是“平庸但过度自信的男人”，他们是妈宝男、向上爬的人、长不大的巨婴和失败者。 另一方则说中国女性都是“小仙女”、拜金女和女权主义者。 但这就像问这个人为什么发烧一样。医生回答说，因为他体温很高。
“平庸却过度自信的男人”、“拜金女”、“女权主义者”和“舔狗男人”等等这类标签。如果它们真的普遍存在，那么它们仅仅是我们需要解释的结果，我们不能用结果来解释结果。大家好，我是张国胜，本期《大写新闻》由郑阙军策划。今天，我们将深入探讨中国社会究竟发生了什么，导致男性和女性都越来越觉得自己处于劣势。TF Entertainment 采用了一种非常不寻常的商业模式，称为练习生培养模式。
偶像工业出售成长
传统意义上的名人是如何诞生的？首先，找到一位二十多岁、能歌善舞、外表也足够出众的成年人，然后发行唱片，让他们参加节目，出演电视剧，看看他们是否会走红。学员培养模式恰恰相反，你从他们十三四岁开始观察他们，也许他们的歌声还有些跑调。明年他们的声音突然变了，现在他们只有 1.6 米高，但两年后他们会猛长到 1.8 米高。他们第一次上台时，紧张得就像大学生答辩一样；三年后，他们已经可以站在体育场中央，为成千上万的观众唱歌了。
训练、考试、失败、朋友间的争吵、生日、长高、变声，所有这些都可以变成内容。因此，传统娱乐公司销售的是明星，而培训生培养模式销售的是某人成为明星的过程。这个行业最宝贵的不是音乐，而是时间。 你从他十四岁开始关注他，到他十八岁出道时，你已经关注他四年了，你为他投票，买他的周边产品，还在半夜和黑粉争论。好吧，你已经投入了这么多，现在你却要说，算了，我不继续关注他了。 这和今天浏览网页时看到一个帅气的陌生人，觉得他长得不错，两天后却连他的账号名都记不起来了，完全是两码事。
这实际上是学员发展模式中商业价值的核心来源——你购买的是一种关系感。这也是为什么十三至十七岁的青少年特别适合这款车型的原因。因为对于成年人来说，一年后最大的变化可能只是体检报告上多了几项危险信号。对于青少年来说，一年后他们可能会变成完全不同的人，成长本身就像一部连续剧。从这种模式中脱颖而出，或许最成功的案例就是易烊千玺。2013年，13岁的他正式以TFBOYS成员的身份出道。
当时，他还是组合中一个经验尚浅的孩子，甚至不是最引人注目的成员。十多年后，他完成了从练习生偶像到主流电影演员的彻底转型。至关重要的是，他后来凭借《大世界》获得了金鸡奖最佳男主角奖。如今易烊千玺最成功的地方不再是他是否是TFBOYS成员中表现最好的，他几乎完全摆脱了偶像的标签。从一个被粉丝们看着长大的 13 岁男孩，他最终成长为一名真正的演员，凭借自己的作品进入了中国主流电影行业。
对于学员培养模式而言，这几乎是理想的最终目标。起初，你卖的是他的成长，最终，这个人真的成长为一颗耀眼的明星。从13岁加入TFBOYS到今天，易烊千玺究竟创造了多少经济价值？没有人能给出确切的数字。因为他的大部分代言合同、音乐收入、粉丝消费和平台价值从未公开。但仅从电影这个最容易衡量的类别来看，他主演或参演的电影总票房已超过200亿元人民币。从《少年的你》到《长津湖之战》和《满江红》，再加上为 Armani、Tiffany、Jaeger-LeCoultre、FILA、华为、天猫等品牌代言，易烊千玺早已不再是靠粉丝购买周边产品维持生计的偶像了。
他是一个超级IP，能够带动数百亿元的文化消费。但问题在于：这种商业模式并非中国人发明的。日本有这种模式，韩国也有这种模式，韩国的男团和女团都采用了这种模式，更不用说日本了。杰尼斯事务所几十年来一直在打造美少年偶像，从老一辈的木村拓哉、泷泽秀明，到中一代的山下智久、二宫和成，再到年轻一代的平野翔、山田凉介、道枝俊辅，这个体系已经吞噬了我们好几代人。另一边，AKB，你好！
像樱花学院这样的偶像企划和女子偶像体系也已经非常成熟了。当然，你也可以告诉我中国也有像SNH48这样的女子组合、年轻女演员和未成年女艺人，也培养出了像鞠婧祎这样的顶级女明星，这些都是真的。 但即使在今天，中国也从未真正出现过一家在规模、持久性和社会影响力方面能与 TF Entertainment 相媲美的偶像工厂，TF Entertainment 公开从 13 或 14 岁就开始培养女孩。
性别边界与现代化
它并不存在。 这是为什么呢？让我们做一个思想实验：一个十四岁的男孩走出来，在他下面是一群二三十岁的女人，她们尖叫着：“老公！宝贝！妈妈爱你！”你可能会觉得这些人精神状态不太好，但你可能不会立即报警。现在把性别全部颠倒过来，一个十四岁的女孩走了出来，下面一群四十岁的男人大喊：“老婆！老婆！看这边！” 难道你没有立刻感觉到不同吗？你甚至还没看到任何违法行为，脑海中的警报就已经响起了。 需要注意的是，这种情况并非中国独有，美国也存在同样的问题。 美国社会始终未能解决这样一个问题：为什么中年男子观看年轻女孩的行为不会显得奇怪。
美国社会同样高度警惕成年男性对未成年人进行性化行为，其主要做法是尽可能将未成年明星制度化，使其成为受保护的儿童表演者。例如，在加利福尼亚州，未成年人进入娱乐行业需要工作许可证；14 至 17 岁的表演者在申请许可证之前还必须完成性骚扰预防培训；为未成年演员提供代理、管理及类似服务的人员必须获得特殊许可证并接受背景调查。换句话说，美国当然也有像麦莉·赛勒斯这样的年轻女明星，但基本的制度态度是，在她成为明星之前，她首先是一个需要保护的孩子。
日本历史上确实发展出一套体系，将成年男性对女偶像的关注重新定义为“推”，支持和陪伴她们成长，将其变成了一种商业仪式。SBS 曾报道过日本所谓的“少年偶像”亚文化，其中一位 11 岁的女孩在东京表演，观众主要是中年男性粉丝，他们购买门票、周边商品并与她合影。报道中提到，一些粉丝表示他们看着她长大，当然，这并不意味着所有日本人都认为这种文化没问题，恰恰相反，这种文化在日本国内外一直备受争议，其核心争议在于儿童性化。
因此，美国、日本和中国之间的真正区别在于，每个社会使用什么样的文化和制度机制来划定未成年偶像和成年粉丝之间的界限。 中国的问题在于现代化进程没有同步进行。1949年以后，中国妇女的地位发生了巨大变化。“妇女能顶半边天”——你们都听过这句话吧？这并非一句完全空洞的宣传口号。妇女获得了大规模的教育机会，进入工厂和办公室工作，挣取工资，并在婚姻中获得了更大的自主权。
这一轮变革发生得非常快，到底有多快？英国学者哈里特·埃文斯在学术期刊《中国季刊》上提出了一个特别有用的术语：“斑驳的父权制”。我把它翻译成“拼凑式父权制”，这是什么意思？ 这意味着中国既不是一个完全传统的父权制社会，也不是一个性别关系完全现代化的社会。有些地方很现代，有些地方则很传统。一位女性在办公室可能已经是项目经理，但回到家后，她可能仍然需要询问孩子是否完成了作业。
女性已经可以获得博士学位，成为医生和工程师。但是结婚后，谁生孩子，谁因生育而中断事业，谁照顾年迈的父母，这些责任并没有以同样的速度重新分配。埃文斯研究的正是这种矛盾。妇女接受教育和就业的机会大幅增加，但妻子、母亲和儿媳等传统家庭角色仍然根深蒂固。所以有一句话特别清楚地概括了这个问题。中国成功地让女性进入学校和工厂，但并没有以同样的速度让男性进入厨房和育儿室。
这已经埋下了当今许多冲突的种子。这不仅仅是家庭劳动分工的问题。中国的性解放进程也未能完全跟上经济和教育现代化的步伐。当然，现在的年轻人生活方式与50年前截然不同。婚前性行为越来越普遍，人们对婚前性行为的接受度也显著提高。但大量研究仍然发现存在性别双重标准。 在婚前性行为、性欲表达和性羞耻方面，男性和女性受到的评判并不完全相同。简单来说，如果一个男人和很多人睡过觉，有些人可能会称他为花花公子；如果一个女人和很多人睡过觉，她得到的标签可能就没那么文雅了。
亲密关系进入经济账本
人们可以不谈婚姻就发生性关系，也可以不结婚就同居多年。谈恋爱并不意味着双方父母下个月就会开始讨论婚房事宜。在中国，通常情况下，两个人一旦进入稳定的恋爱关系，不久之后，各种幕后进程就会自动开始运行。你从哪来？ 你父母是做什么的？你拥有房产吗？ 你打算在哪个城市居住？你们什么时候结婚？你什么时候要孩子？一段爱情故事，随着谈话的进行，突然变得像是对一家上市公司的尽职调查。
因此，在中国，现实世界中的异性恋关系特别容易过早地进入婚姻的经济范畴。真正改变婚姻市场结构的是计划生育。我们通常谈到计划生育时，首先想到的是人口减少，但对于男女关系而言，它也产生了两个完全相反的结果。第一个结果是，它使一代女孩变得更加坚强。毕业于哈佛大学的人类学家凡妮莎·方出生于台湾，在美国长大。上世纪90年代末，她曾在大连长期居住，研究中国第一代独生子女的情况。
人口政策如何改变婚姻市场
她追踪了 2000 多名中国青少年，后来发现了一个非常违反直觉的结果。虽然独生子女政策造成了许多人口问题，但它却出人意料地赋予了一代城市女孩力量。因为当一个家庭只有一个女儿时，原本可能优先用于儿子的教育和家庭资源，现在只能全部投入到她身上。因此，方的结论是，低生育率和独生女家庭结构出乎意料地增强了城市女孩挑战传统性别规范的能力。但同样的计划生育政策也产生了第二个后果：它减少了女孩的数量。
因为计划生育是在一个完全没有重男轻女观念的社会中实施的。当“最好只生一个孩子”与“最好生个儿子”这两个概念重叠时。大家都知道发生了什么，出生性别比例严重失衡。这是一个经典的概率问题。如果没有计划生育政策，但重男轻女的观念仍然存在，一个家庭只有在生了儿子后才停止生育，那么最终男孩和女孩的比例会是多少？答案是 1 比 1。至于具体的推理过程。如果你感兴趣，可以向人工智能提问。
虽然这有悖常理，但如果没有计划生育，重男轻女本身并不会导致男女比例失衡。2011年，长期研究中国人口和家庭经济学的三位经济学家李洪斌、易俊健和张俊森在当年的顶级人口学期刊《人口学》上发表了一篇重要论文。他们利用中国汉族人口和少数民族在计划生育政策执行方式上的差异，进行了一项准自然实验。他们估计，在 1991 年至 2005 年期间的出生中，独生子女政策本身导致每 100 个女孩中大约多出 7 个男孩。
但我们需要更进一步思考：如果唯一的问题是计划生育导致男性多于女性，那么它未必会演变成我们今天看到的激烈冲突。人口结构失衡只会加剧男性之间的竞争，但他们究竟在竞争什么呢？这取决于这个社会给人们提供了哪些竞争机会。 正是在这个时候，改革、开放和市场化开始发挥作用。过去，大家都很穷，所以其实没什么可比性。多几亩农田或者多一间房子当然很重要，但那时还没有形成如今这种高度货币化的约会和婚姻筛选系统。
但改革开放后，中国迅速成为一个收入不平等、职业分层、城乡差距和资产差距日益明显的社会，尤其是住房，逐渐成为婚姻中最昂贵、最显眼、最容易比较的资产之一。因此，原本只是由于男性多于女性而导致的人口竞争，突然间有了非常清晰的比分。你收入多少？ 你从事什么工作？你住在哪个城市？ 你拥有房产吗？你开什么车？你的父母能帮你支付首付吗？换句话说，计划生育创造了竞争，而市场化则给这种竞争标上了价格。
女性人数较少并不会直接决定哪些男性会结婚，真正决定男性婚姻状况的是社会用来筛选人群的标准。在一个住房高度商品化的快速市场化社会中，收入、职业和财产自然而然地成为最便捷的筛选条件。所以，当今男女之间的冲突不能简单地用“为什么现在的女性如此物质主义”来解释。如果你把婚姻市场看作最简单的供求市场，那么政策就已经扭曲了整个供求曲线。首先，让我们从男性的角度来看，如果一个中国男人今天准备结婚，他往往会面临一套非常传统的期望：他的收入最好更高，理想情况下他应该拥有一套房子；在一些地区，还有彩礼，而且他最好有一份稳定的工作。
简而言之，性别平等已经写入宪法和社会价值观。但是，男性作为家庭经济支柱的角色并没有以同样的速度退出历史舞台。许多男人心中都有一个非常合理的问题：如果男人和女人是平等的，为什么还要我来买房子？为什么婚前依然要主要考察我的收入？为什么彩礼的大部分要由我来支付？这并非完全不合理。但现在让我们站在女性的角度，她看到的是一个完全不同的Excel表格。谁会怀孕？ 谁负责生育？
谁还在哺乳？ 谁更有可能因为孩子而中断职业生涯？孩子生病时，单位通常第一个打电话给谁？当年迈的父母需要照顾时，谁承担更多的责任？所以女性也完全有理由问：如果男女平等，为什么我还要赚钱？然而，生育的费用仍然主要由我承担。这时你会意识到，双方都没有完全错误。男性承担了更多的婚姻入门成本。婚姻开始后以及婚姻失败后，女性承担的风险更大。为了进行比较，我们来看看其他国家，为什么北欧的福利制度会影响男女之间的关系？
谁承担婚姻与育儿成本
因为它们确实能帮助夫妻化解这些冲突。假设养育一个孩子需要花费 100 个单位，其中托儿所、育儿假、儿童津贴、公共医疗保健、陪产假等，政府和社会承担了其中的 60 个单位，剩下的 40 个单位由夫妻双方自行协商。 如果社会只覆盖了10个人，那么剩下的90个人怎么办？当然，这对夫妻自己也会为此争吵。女人说，你为什么不能多照顾孩子？那人说：“我已经在外面赚钱了。”最终，一个本应由财政部劳动部门负责的问题，以及育儿政策问题，演变成了一场餐桌上的性别战争。
退出成本也非常重要。美国法律社会学家伊桑·米歇尔森研究了中国两个省份的大量离婚判决。 他发现，在他研究的案例中，不到一半的案件最终获得了法院批准的离婚；而且，当女性指控家庭暴力时，并没有显著提高在第一次诉讼中获得离婚的可能性；第一次离婚申请被驳回的做法对女性产生了特别明显的负面影响。这说明了经济学中一个非常简单的原理：如果退出成本很高，人们当然会更加谨慎地进入。
如果购买一双鞋子时享受七天无理由退货政策，您可以毫不犹豫地下单。如果销售人员告诉你，一旦购买，一般不允许退货，如果你真的想退货，必须先提起诉讼，六个月后再来，那么你肯定会更加仔细地试穿。婚姻显然不是一双鞋，但其中的风险逻辑是类似的。所以，至此，我们可以得出今天整集节目的核心结论。男性觉得婚姻越来越昂贵，女性觉得婚姻越来越危险。这是男女冲突中真正困难的部分，双方都能在现实中找到证据来支持自己的受害者心态，而且双方都有道理。
经济放缓与性别冲突
但为什么这种感觉在近几年变得尤为强烈？因为经济增长放缓。需要注意的是，经济衰退并不是性别冲突的根源，男女之间的冲突已经存在了几十年，经济衰退更像是一次压力测试。经济快速增长时，许多不公平的制度实际上可以继续存在。男人们说，住房很贵，但几年后工资会再次上涨。妇女们说，家务活很多，但家庭收入不断增长，所以生活总体上会越来越好。人们或许会抱怨，但蛋糕正在越做越大。
一旦蛋糕不再怎么增长，大家做的第一件事就是开始数数。为什么你的那块比我的大？日本实际上也经历过非常类似的变革。战后日本最典型的中产阶级家庭是什么样的？丈夫外出工作，妻子全职在家照顾家庭。当然，这种模式与日本传统的性别文化有关，但不要忘记，它也有一个非常重要的物质条件。当时，一个人的工资真的可以养活一家人。1980年，日本只有丈夫工作的家庭数量大约是双职工家庭数量的两倍。
到了 20 世纪 90 年代，双职工家庭的数量开始超过单职工家庭，并且持续增长。 日本政府数据本身就记录了这一转变。回顾上世纪90年代的日本电影和电视节目，你会发现一些特别有趣的事情。1991 年的电视剧《东京爱情故事》表面上看起来像是一部爱情剧，但剧中的角色赤名梨花实际上很好地代表了泡沫经济末期和崩溃前后出现的那一代都市女性。她有自己的工作和生活，并且积极表达自己的感受。
她不再是那种等待男人来决定她的婚姻和人生的传统女性。她和完二之间真正的冲突在于，两人对爱情、婚姻自由和生活节奏的理解不同。从某种意义上说，当《东京爱情故事》走红时，日本女性正日益成为独立的现代都市个体，但社会对婚姻、家庭和性别角色的期望还没有完全跟上。换句话说，女性早已步入现代社会，但旧的婚姻模式仍然将她们拖回原点。随着泡沫破裂、经济停滞、双职工家庭增多，这种矛盾变得更加明显，也越来越突出。
随后，2016 年的《全职太太逃亡记》系列剧集将问题变得更加直接，由新垣结衣饰演的女主角直接与男主角签订了契约婚姻：“你雇佣我做你的妻子，那么厨艺值多少钱呢？”清洁服务值多少钱？ 家务劳动算劳动吗？日本内阁府后来在讨论家务分工时，甚至直接以这部电视剧为例。在该剧中，丈夫扮演雇主的角色，计算妻子每月做家务的工资。你看，一部浪漫喜剧最终变成了一堂关于婚姻经济学的生动课程。
它为何引起如此强烈的共鸣？因为传统婚姻喜欢说“我们是一家人”，所以为什么要把所有事情都计算得那么精确呢？但是一旦夫妻双方都需要进入劳动力市场，人们就会突然意识到，是的，你真的需要好好计算一下。在某种程度上，当今中国正在经历类似的变革，只不过过去中国女性的劳动参与率已经相对较高，人们仍然可以要求男性买房养家，拥有稳定的收入，但如今，对于一个普通男性来说，独自承担住房、子女教育和养老的费用，这种传统的供养者角色变得越来越难以履行。
与此同时，女性也越来越无法说“总有一天我会找到一个男人来养活我”。你甚至可以观察到一个非常明显的现象：街上的女网约车司机越来越常见，女外卖员也不再是新闻了，这实际上是一种极具象征意义的变化。女性赚钱的义务增加了，而传统的女性义务却没有相应减少；与此同时，男性养家糊口的能力下降了，而传统的男性义务也没有相应减少。这让事情变得更加困难。 男人们都觉得我连自己都养活不了，凭什么还指望我按照 1998 年的标准来当一家之主？
女人们心想，既然我们俩显然都要赚钱养家，为什么你还认为回家后做饭和照顾孩子是我的工作呢？因此，经济问题很快就演变成性别问题。女性究竟在抱怨什么？就业歧视、生育成本、家务劳动、家庭暴力、财产和托儿费用。男人到底在抱怨什么？房价、收入、结婚彩礼成本、职业压力和社会地位。你看，谈论这些事情听起来是不是非常学术化？我们应该如何设计一个普惠的儿童保育体系？把这个标题发到抖音上，连你都不想点进去。
当结构性问题变成流量话题
但改成：为什么现在的女性如此物质主义？车流来了。或者换个说法：为什么中国男性越来越配不上中国女性？现在双方的观点都出现了。香港中文大学的何仁义提出了一个非常有趣的概念，叫做“性别平等歧视”。这意味着什么？ 这意味着你可能会说类似这样的话：我当然支持性别平等，但是，呃，通常情况下，当句子中出现“但是”这个词时，有趣的部分就开始了。但如今女性已经凌驾于男性之上，而女权主义者却在要求特权，为什么只有女性应该受到保护？
这种言论尤其具有影响力，因为它没有公开宣称性别不平等是可取的，而是恰恰以支持“真正的平等”的名义，重新组织了性别敌意。当然，同样的事情也会发生在另一边，这些平台上一些以女性为中心的内容也会从结构上将男性压缩成某种人格类型。 过度自信、令人厌恶、妈宝男，穷得连结婚都顾不上。因此，双方越来越不去讨论政策应该如何改变，而是讨论对方性别作为一个整体是否存在根本缺陷。这让我们对杨力有了新的认识，也让我们对TF娱乐公司楼下发生的事情有了新的认识。
平台如何放大对立
平台不需要解决男女之间的冲突，冲突本身就是产品。加油，张国生，你能行的。我最终等到王主任休假出来才动手。一旦我设好陷阱，王就倒下了，张就上位了。算了，他可能还要过一段时间才能到。 我先休息一下。 天气这么热，我都累坏了，可我才挖了两厘米。怎么会有人沉迷于如此肤浅的事情？ 嘿！ 他去哪儿了？ 他摔倒在哪里了？首先，我想告诉大家，我几天前受伤了。我们学校里有个小水坑。中午时分，我和同学们一起吃饭，不小心踩进了这个小水坑里。
正当我准备踩进去的时候，我“啊！”了一声。然后我就摔倒了，你知道吗？经历了这一切之后，你可能已经忘记了，这一集最初显然是从几个十几岁的男孩开始的，但现在当我们再次审视偶像时，整件事看起来完全不同了。现实世界中的异性恋关系包含哪些内容？房贷、工资、双方父母的孩子、家务、财产、忠诚责任，以及分手后谁在微信上删除谁。偶像能提供什么？ 她们拥有美貌、青春、温柔和歌喉，可以对大家说：“谢谢大家一直陪伴着我”，然后你关掉视频，就结束了。
退出、替代与分裂
这是一种成本极低、控制感极强的亲密形式。传播学中有一个古老的概念叫做准社会关系。研究人员使用了更直接的术语“补偿性浪漫”（Compensatory Romance）。 研究人员对中国女粉丝进行了两年的跟踪调查，发现“女友粉丝”和“妈妈粉丝”等身份实际上提供了一个特殊的情感空间，使女性能够在现实世界约会和婚姻的压力之外，重新组织自己的欲望和想象中的亲密形式。
更有趣的是，中国女粉丝用来称呼男偶像的词语本身就相当混乱，比如丈夫、儿子、妻子、女儿。是的，甚至包括妻子和女儿。称呼男偶像为“妻子”或“女儿”就像景甜要求孙哥叫她“妈妈”一样奇怪。妈妈！ 牛来！妈妈！ 牛来！中国粉丝文化的一个特点是，所有这些标签都可以随意切换，而不需要任何逻辑一致性。其他常见的称呼包括：宝贝、小家伙、弟弟、哥哥、甜心、好女儿、好儿子、我的女孩。
前一秒你想嫁给他，下一秒你想喂他吃饭。这意味着将自己和男性偶像置于想象中的浪漫或家庭关系中。那么，为什么女性尤其容易追捧男性偶像呢？我不认为答案是中国女性比其他地方的女性更痴迷于男性。更好的解释是，当现实世界亲密关系的相对成本上升时，低风险幻想的相对价值也会上升。中国男性对幻想的消费并没有消失，只是更多地转向了游戏、动漫文化、女性主播、虚拟偶像，现在甚至还有人工智能女友。
因此，中国最终出现了一种非常奇怪的结果：女性的幻想对象往往变成了现实生活中的男性偶像，而男性的幻想对象则越来越多地变成了虚拟女性或基于平台的互动产品。所以资本最终发现，打造青少年男性偶像非常有利可图，那么为什么中国有TFBOYS，却从未有过真正意义上的TFGIRLS呢？直到现在答案才完整，它并非中国性别冲突的根源，更像是X光片，你所看到的是现实世界性别关系的结构性转变，这种转变在娱乐市场留下了阴影。
首先，我们必须明确一点：欧洲和美国在性别关系方面也并非天堂。美国有“非自愿独身者”（incel）群体、男性圈、安德鲁·泰特，以及对#MeToo运动的反弹。青年男女的政治态度也出现了分歧。但美国的情况有所不同，许多性别冲突被重新组织成更大的政治阵营。保守派女性和保守派男性可以站在一起，自由派男性和女权主义者也可以站在一起。最终呈现的是民主党与共和党、自由派与保守派之间的对立，而不是总是把一切都简化为男人与女人之间的对立。
与此同时，欧洲的福利国家利用育儿假和劳动保护，将原本会在夫妻之间发生的利益冲突转移到机构来解决。日本更有意思。虽然日本如今还不能被称为性别平等的典范，但日本处理男女冲突的一个典型方式并非一定要改变对方，而是选择退出。不结婚、晚婚、不生孩子的男人转向动漫文化，女人追随男性偶像，男人有自己的女性偶像和御宅文化，女人有自己的杰尼斯事务所、BL和乙女游戏，不同的群体待在自己的房间里做着自己的事。日本成人电影产业是什么时候真正兴起的？
在泡沫经济时代。对于对这段历史感兴趣的人，我推荐观看 Netflix 上由山田孝之主演的《全裸导演》。太棒了。该剧赋予成人电影行业完全不同的意义，甚至能让你感受到人性的某种提升。咳，我好像跑题了。从某种意义上说，日本从未彻底解决性别冲突，它只是允许越来越多的人做出选择，那么也许我们应该减少彼此之间的关系。中国今天所经历的是一种更加极端的“退出+冲突”状态：一方面，人们退出现实世界的约会和婚姻；另一方面，抖音、微博和小红书等社交媒体不断将两者推向对立面。
你可能原本对另一边的人在做什么完全不感兴趣，但算法却坚持告诉你：令人震惊！这就是如今女性的现状。接下来的一条帖子写道：快来看看男人们崩溃了。因此，在现实生活中，双方认识的对方的人越来越少，而在网络上，他们却越来越熟悉“对方群体”。这实际上与我在上一期关于黑猩猩内战的节目中讨论的机制非常相似。对一个社会而言，真正危险的是连接双方的人开始消失，直到最终你不再认识对方的任何具体个体，你只认识算法向你描述的“他们”。
男人不再是张三、李思或王武，在“小仙女”口中变成了“中国男人”；女人不再是你的大学同学、同事和邻居，她们变成了短视频里的拜金女。从那时起，双方就真正开始生活在两个不同的世界里了。现在让我们回到长江国际，一边是什么呢？ 一群女性投入金钱、时间和情感，打造了一个极具价值的青少年男性偶像产业。另一边是什么？一些男性主播发现，嘲笑这些女性也能赚钱。然后，一件超现实的事情发生了。
第一家企业将十几岁的男孩卖给女性。第二家公司向另一群男性兜售对这些女性的嘲讽。最终，这两家企业以某种方式在同一栋楼里相遇，完成了一次线下跨界合作。这是当今中国性别冲突中最危险的反馈循环之一。事实上，男女之间关系的成本不断上升，男女开始进入他们自己的情感替代世界。两种文化空间日益分离，双方对彼此的了解也越来越少。平台发现，将双方推向对立面可以带来流量，而冲突会进一步强化性别刻板印象，最终使现实世界的人际关系更加困难。
四个更深层的原因
然后，这种循环不断重复，冲突进一步加剧，陷入恶性循环。 因此，如果要找出当今性别冲突的最深层原因，我认为至少有四个原因尤为重要。首先是计划生育。它以前所未有的规模改变了男女之间的人数平衡，同时出人意料地造就了一代更有能力、有更多选择的都市女性。与此同时，计划生育还产生了另一种不太明显的后果。独生子女现在也进入了婚姻市场，每个伴侣背后都只有一条直接的家庭责任链。 人们对养老、情感支持和财产的期望都集中在独生子女身上。
两个从小习惯于以整个家庭为中心的人，成年后必须同时承担两套家庭责任。因此，婚姻更像是两个单一核心家庭之间的碰撞。这也解释了为什么最孤独的一代人反而更倾向于在约会和婚姻中强调自我，并且更难做出妥协。第二，经济衰退。它拆解了维持旧有性别分工的经济结构，男性越来越难以独自承担传统的养家糊口的角色，而女性则越来越需要承担赚钱的责任。第三，福利保障不足。儿童、年迈的父母和家务劳动等原本可以更大程度上社会化的成本，都被留在了家庭内部，迫使男女进行直接的零和博弈。
第四，亲密关系中的权利保护和退出机制。当退出的成本和风险很高时，每个人在选择进入的条件时都会变得更加谨慎和功利。当这四件事同时发生时，中国最终会陷入一种脱节的状态。现代社会已经形成了男女平等的观念，但男女的传统义务并没有完全消失。所以女性们会问，为什么我既要像现代女性一样工作，又要像传统女性一样生育、养育孩子、照顾家庭？男人们会问：为什么我既要接受现代性别平等，又要像传统男人一样买房、赚钱、养家糊口？
你会发现双方其实都在说同一件事：为什么旧的义务仍然属于我？虽然这些新权利属于你。这就是当今中国性别冲突的核心问题。这并不是因为一方完全由坏人组成，而是因为每一方都能在现实中找到证据证明自己确实吃了亏，所以最简单的解释自然而然就变成了这一切都是对方的错。然后平台就站在旁边说，是的，是的，你说得对，再侮辱他们一点，我就会给你带来更多流量。 最终，我们得到了一个特别讽刺的世界：幻想中的异性变得越来越完美——女性拥有永远温柔英俊的男性偶像，男性拥有永远年轻顺从的动漫女孩和人工智能伴侣。 但现实生活中的异性越来越像是一种成本，越来越像是一种风险，越来越像一份期限极长、违约责任不明确、且签约后无法保证可以终止的合同。
真正令人担忧的或许不仅仅是中国男女之间日益增长的厌恶感，他们越来越不需要彼此来满足情感需求，但他们仍然需要在人生中最重大的问题上相互合作：住房、生育、养老和家庭。于是我们回到 TF Entertainment 楼下的区域，那天晚上表面上发生的是一群女粉丝和一群男主播的碰撞，但在他们背后真正碰撞的是过去几十年在中国由人口政策、剧烈的经济变革、家庭制度、性别规范和互联网平台共同作用而形成的两个世界。
On August 20, Chongqing Nan’an police issued an official statement confirming that people had gathered and argued here on the evening of August 17 and TF Entertainment later suspended centralized training for its trainees at Changjiang International. As for online claims about who started the fight and how many streamers came specifically to provoke them. There are many different versions, and as for which side was right or wrong at the moment, it is very hard to say. Fans taking sides and fighting with each other is nothing unusual. What makes this incident so surreal is that this dispute wasn’t between two groups of idol fans. A significant number of the men drawn into it were never consumers of these boy idols in the first place.
So why did they come? One very straightforward explanation is that this incident attracts traffic. You walk into a crowd of female fans and deliberately shout memes they hate then film them and mock them. Naturally, the female fans fight back. The fiercer the reaction, the more exciting the livestream the more exciting the livestream, the more people watch and the more people watch, the more people rush over. And so, downstairs from an ordinary office building it suddenly turned into a giant reality-show set. We’ve actually seen this mechanism many times before. For example, famous stand-up comedian Yang Li’s line “Why does he look so ordinary yet feel so confident?” A single joke from a stand-up routine eventually grew into an online gender war brand controversies, and even boycott campaigns.
Why is it that in China today, between men and women so much gunpowder has already accumulated that all it takes is one streamer to light a match and the whole thing ignites. If you search online for an answer it may seem very simple. One side says it’s because Chinese men are all “average-yet-overconfident men” mama’s boys, social climbers, overgrown babies and losers. The other side says Chinese women are all “little fairies” gold diggers and feminazis. But that’s like asking why does this person have a fever? And the doctor answers, because his temperature is high.
“Average-yet-overconfident men,” gold-digging women, feminazis and “simp men,” these kinds of labels. If they really are widespread then they are merely outcomes that we need to explain we cannot use the outcome to explain the outcome. Hello everyone, I’m Zhang Gousheng this episode of “News in Caps” was planned by Zhengquejun. Today, we’re going to take a deep look at what exactly has happened in Chinese society that makes both men and women increasingly believe that they are the ones getting the short end of the stick. TF Entertainment is in a very unusual business called the trainee-development model.
The Idol Industry Sells Growth
How are traditional celebrities made? First, you find an adult in their twenties who can sing, can dance, and already looks polished enough then release records and put them on shows and cast them in TV dramas to see whether they become popular. The trainee-development model does the exact opposite you start watching them when they’re thirteen or fourteen maybe their singing is still a little off-key. Next year their voice suddenly changes, and right now they’re only 1.6 meters tall but two years later they shoot up to 1.8 meters. The first time they go onstage, they’re as nervous as a college student defending a thesis three years later, they can already stand in the middle of a stadium and sing to tens of thousands of people.
Training, exams, failure, friendship arguments, birthdays, growing taller, voice changes all of it can be turned into content. So traditional entertainment companies sell stars while the trainee-development model sells the process of someone becoming a star. The most valuable thing about this business isn’t the music it’s time. You start following him when he’s fourteen and by the time he debuts at eighteen, you’ve already followed him for four years you’ve voted for him and bought his merchandise and argued with haters in the middle of the night. Alright, you’ve already invested that much and now you’re supposed to say, forget it I’m done following him. That’s completely different from scrolling past a handsome stranger today thinking he looks pretty good, then two days later not even remembering what his account was called they are two completely different things.
This is actually the core source of commercial value in the trainee-development model what you’re buying is a sense of relationship. This is also why ages thirteen to seventeen are especially suitable for this model. Because after one year passes for an adult the biggest change may be a few more red flags on their medical report. For a teenager, after one year, they may look like a completely different person growth itself is a serialized drama. The person who emerged from this model as perhaps its most successful product is Jackson Yee. In 2013, when he was 13, he officially debuted as a member of TFBOYS
back then, he was still a somewhat inexperienced kid standing in the group and not even the most eye-catching one. More than a decade later, he has completed a full transformation from trainee idol to mainstream film actor. Crucially, he later won the Golden Rooster Award for Best Actor for Big World. The most successful thing about Jackson Yee today is no longer whether he has done the best among the members of TFBOYS he has almost completely shed the idol label. From a 13-year-old boy whom fans watched grow up he ultimately grew into a real actor able to enter China’s mainstream film industry on the strength of his work.
For the trainee-development model, this is almost the ideal endgame. At first, what you were selling was his growth and in the end, that person truly grew into a star. From joining TFBOYS at age 13 to today how much economic value has Jackson Yee actually created? No one can give an exact figure. Because much of his endorsement contracts, music income, fan spending, and platform value has never been made public. But looking only at film, the easiest category to measure the movies he has starred in or appeared in have already grossed more than 20 billion yuan in total. From Better Days to The Battle at Lake Changjin and Full River Red plus commercial endorsements for Armani, Tiffany, Jaeger-LeCoultre, FILA, Huawei, Tmall, and others Jackson Yee has long since ceased to be an idol sustained by fans buying merchandise.
He is a super IP capable of driving tens of billions of yuan in cultural consumption. But here’s the problem: this business model was not invented by the Chinese. Japan has it, South Korea has it, and Korean boy groups and girl groups both use this model, not to mention Japan. Johnny; Associates spent decades producing pretty-boy idols from the older generation’s Takuya Kimura Hideaki Takizawa, to the middle generation’s Tomohisa Yamashita Kazunari Ninomiya, and then the younger generation’s Sho Hirano Ryosuke Yamada and Shunsuke Michieda this system has been consuming several generations of us. On the other side, AKB, Hello! Project
and girl-idol systems like Sakura Gakuin are also extremely mature. Of course, you can tell me China also has girl groups, such as SNH48 young actresses, and underage female entertainers and it has also produced top female stars like Ju Jingyi all true. But even today, China has never truly produced one that, in terms of scale longevity, and social influence, fully matches TF Entertainment a girl-idol factory that publicly starts developing girls at age thirteen or fourteen.
Gender Boundaries and Modernization
It doesn’t exist. So, why is that? Let’s do a thought experiment a fourteen-year-old boy walks out and below him is a crowd of women in their twenties and thirties screaming “Husband! Baby! Mommy loves you!” You might think these people are in quite a mental state but you probably wouldn’t immediately call the police. Now reverse all the genders a fourteen-year-old girl walks out and a crowd of forty-year-old men below shouts “Wife! Wife! Look over here!” Doesn’t it instantly feel different? You haven’t even seen any illegal behavior yet and the alarm in your head is already going off. Note that this is not entirely unique to China the United States is the same. American society has never solved the question of why middle-aged men watching young girls should not seem strange.
American society is equally highly wary of adult men sexualizing minors its main approach is to institutionalize underage stars as protected child performers as much as possible. For example, minors entering the entertainment industry in California need work permits performers aged 14 to 17 must also complete sexual-harassment prevention training before applying for a permit and people providing agency, management, and similar services to underage actors must obtain special permits and undergo background checks. In other words, America certainly has young female stars like Miley Cyrus but the basic institutional attitude is before she is a star, she is first and foremost a child who needs protection
Japan really did historically develop a system that reframed adult men’s attention toward girl idols as “oshi” supporting them and accompanying them as they grow, turning it into a commercial ritual. SBS once reported on Japan’s so-called Junior Idol subculture where an 11-year-old girl performed in Tokyo and the audience was mainly middle-aged men fans bought tickets, merchandise, and photos with her. In the report, some fans themselves said they were watching her grow up of course, this does not mean everyone in Japan thinks this culture is fine quite the opposite, it has always been highly controversial both inside and outside Japan and the core controversy is the sexualization of children.
So the real difference among the United States, Japan, and China is what kinds of cultural and institutional mechanisms each society uses to draw boundaries between underage idols and adult fans. China’s problem is that modernization has not happened in sync. After 1949, the status of women in China changed dramatically. “Women hold up half the sky”—you’ve all heard that, right? This was not a completely empty propaganda slogan. Women gained access to education on a massive scale entered factories and offices earned wages, and gained significantly greater autonomy in marriage.
This round of change happened extremely quickly how quickly? British scholar Harriet Evans proposed in the academic journal The China Quarterly a particularly useful term: “Patchy Patriarchy.” I translate it as “patchwork patriarchy” What does that mean? It means China is not a completely traditional patriarchal society nor is it a society where gender relations have been fully modernized. It is modern in some places and traditional in others. A woman may already be a project manager at the office but when she gets home, she may still be the one expected to ask whether the child has finished their homework.
Women can already earn PhDs become doctors and engineers. But after marriage, who gives birth who interrupts their career because of childbirth who takes care of elderly parents, these responsibilities have not been redistributed at the same pace. This contradiction is exactly what Evans studies. Women’s access to education and employment has increased dramatically but traditional family roles such as wife, mother, and daughter-in-law remain extremely persistent. So there is one sentence that captures this problem particularly clearly. China successfully brought women into schools and factories but did not bring men into kitchens and nurseries at the same pace.
This had already planted the seeds of many of today’s conflicts. And it is not just about the division of household labor. China’s sexual liberation has also failed to fully keep pace with economic and educational modernization. Of course, young people today are not living like they did 50 years ago. Premarital sex is becoming increasingly common and acceptance of premarital sex has also risen significantly. But a large body of research still finds gender double standards. Men and women are not judged in exactly the same way when it comes to premarital sex expressing sexual desire, and sexual shame. Simply put, if a man has slept with many people some people might call him a player if a woman has slept with many people the label she gets may not be nearly as elegant.
When Intimacy Enters the Ledger
People can have sex without talking about marriage and can live together for many years without getting married. Dating also does not mean that both sets of parents will start discussing a marital home next month. In China, it is often not like that once two people enter a stable relationship before long, the background processes start running automatically. Where are you from? What do your parents do? Do you own a home? Which city do you plan to live in? When are you getting married? When are you having children? A love story, as the conversation goes on suddenly starts to look like due diligence for a listed company.
So in China, real-world heterosexual relationships are especially prone to entering the economics of marriage early. And what truly transformed the structure of this marriage market was family planning. When we usually talk about family planning the first thing we think of is a smaller population but for relations between men and women it also produced two results pointing in completely opposite directions. The first result was that it made a generation of girls stronger. Harvard-trained anthropologist Vanessa Fong was born in Taiwan and raised in the United States. In the late 1990s, she lived in Dalian for an extended period studying China’s first generation of only children.
How Population Policy Changed the Marriage Market
She tracked more than 2,000 Chinese adolescents and later discovered a highly counterintuitive result. Although the one-child policy created many demographic problems it unexpectedly empowered a generation of urban girls. Because when a family had only one daughter the education and family resources that might once have gone first to a son could now only all be invested in her. So Fong’s conclusion was that low fertility and the only-daughter family structure unexpectedly strengthened urban girls’ ability to challenge traditional gender norms. But the same family-planning policy also did a second thing it reduced the number of girls.
Because family planning was not implemented in a society completely free of son preference. When “it’s best to have only one child” overlapped with “it’s best to have a son.” Everyone knows what happened the sex ratio at birth became severely imbalanced. Here is a classic probability problem. If there were no family-planning policy but son preference still existed and a family only stopped having children once it had a son what would the final ratio of boys to girls be? The answer is 1 to 1. As for the exact reasoning process. If you’re interested, you can ask AI.
Although it is counterintuitive, without family planning son preference by itself would not cause an imbalance in the male-to-female ratio. In 2011, three economists who had long studied China’s population and family economics Hongbin Li, Junjian Yi, and Junsen Zhang published an important paper in the leading demography journal Demography that year. They used differences between China’s Han population and ethnic minorities in how family-planning policies were enforced to conduct a quasi-natural experiment. They estimated that for births between 1991 and 2005 the one-child policy itself resulted in about 7 extra boys for every 100 girls.
But we need to take this one step further if the only issue were that family planning created more men than women it would not necessarily have evolved into the intense conflict we see today. The demographic imbalance merely intensified competition among men but what exactly are they competing over? That depends on what this society gives people to compete over. This is where reform, opening up, and marketization entered the picture. In the past, everyone was poor, so there was actually not much to compare having a few more mu of farmland or one extra room in the house of course mattered, but it had not yet created today’s highly monetized filtering system for dating and marriage.
But after reform and opening up, China rapidly became a society where income inequality, occupational stratification, the urban-rural divide and disparities in assets all became increasingly pronounced especially housing, which gradually became one of the most expensive and visible and easiest-to-compare assets in marriage. So what had originally been simple demographic competition caused by having more men than women suddenly acquired a very clear scoreboard. How much do you earn? What do you do for work? Which city do you live in? Do you own a home? What kind of car do you drive? Can your parents even help with the down payment? In other words, family planning created the competition and marketization put a price tag on that competition.
Having fewer women does not automatically determine which men get married what truly determines the ranking is which criteria society uses to filter people. And in a rapidly marketizing society where housing is highly commodified income, occupation, and property naturally become the most convenient filters. So today’s conflict between men and women cannot be explained simply by saying, “Why are women so materialistic these days?” If you treat the marriage market as the simplest kind of supply-and-demand market policy has already distorted the entire supply-and-demand curve. First, let’s look at it from the man’s side if a Chinese man today is preparing to get married he often faces a very traditional set of expectations his income should preferably be higher, and ideally he should own a home in some regions there is also a bride price and preferably he should have a stable career.
Simply put, gender equality has already entered the constitution and social values. But the male provider the role of the man as the breadwinner has not retired at the same pace. So many men have a perfectly reasonable question in their minds if men and women are equal, why am I still expected to buy the house? Why is my income still the main thing being evaluated before marriage? Why am I expected to pay most of the bride price? That is not entirely unreasonable. But now let’s stand on the woman’s side she sees a completely different Excel spreadsheet. Who gets pregnant? Who gives birth?
Who breastfeeds? Who is more likely to interrupt their career because of the child? When the child gets sick, who does the workplace usually call first? When elderly parents need care, who takes on more of the burden? So women also have a completely reasonable question if men and women are equal, why do I also have to earn money? And yet the costs of childbirth still fall mainly on me. At this point, you realize that neither side is entirely wrong. Men bear more of the entry costs of marriage. Women bear more of the risks after marriage begins and after it fails. For comparison, let’s look at other countries why do Nordic welfare systems affect relations between men and women?
Who Bears the Costs of Marriage and Childcare
Because they are effectively helping couples defuse these conflicts. Suppose raising a child costs 100 units daycare, parental leave, child allowances public healthcare, paternity leave the government and society cover 60 of those units leaving the couple with only 40 units to negotiate between themselves. If society only covers 10 then what happens to the remaining 90? Naturally, the couple fights over it themselves. The woman says, why can’t you take care of the child more? The man says, I’m already out there earning money. In the end, a problem that should really have gone to the finance ministry labor authorities, and childcare policy turns into a gender war at the dinner table.
The cost of exit is also very important. American legal sociologist Ethan Michelson studied a large number of divorce rulings in two Chinese provinces. He found that in the cases he studied fewer than half resulted in a court-granted divorce and when women alleged domestic violence it did not significantly increase the likelihood of obtaining a divorce in the first lawsuit the practice of denying divorce on the first attempt had an especially pronounced impact on women. This illustrates a very simple principle in economics if exiting is expensive, of course people will be more cautious about entering.
If you buy a pair of shoes with a seven-day no-questions-asked return policy you can place the order without much hesitation. If the salesperson tells you that once you buy them, returns are generally not allowed and if you really want to return them, you must first file a lawsuit and then come back six months later, you will definitely try them on much more carefully. Marriage is obviously not a pair of shoes, but the logic of risk is similar. So at this point, we can arrive at the central sentence of today’s entire episode. Men feel that marriage is becoming more and more expensive women feel that marriage is becoming more and more dangerous. This is the truly difficult part of the conflict between men and women both sides can find evidence in reality to support their sense of victimhood and both sides have a point.
Economic Slowdown and Gender Conflict
But why has this feeling become especially strong in recent years? Because the economy is slowing down. Note that economic decline is not the root cause of gender conflict conflicts between men and women have existed for decades economic decline is more like a stress test. When the economy is growing rapidly many unfair systems can actually survive. Men say, housing is expensive, but wages will rise again in a few years. Women say, there is a lot of housework, but household income keeps rising so life will get better overall. People may have complaints, but the pie is getting bigger.
Once the pie stops growing much the first thing everyone does is start counting. Why is your slice bigger than mine? Japan actually went through a very similar change. What was the most typical postwar middle-class Japanese family like? A salaryman, with the husband going out to work and the wife being a full-time housewife. Of course, this model was related to Japan’s traditional gender culture but don’t forget that it also had one very important material condition. At that time, one man’s salary really could support an entire family. In 1980, the number of Japanese households where only the husband worked was roughly twice the number of dual-income households.
By the 1990s, dual-income households began to outnumber them and continued to grow. Japanese government data itself records this transition. If you look back at Japanese film and television from the 1990s you’ll notice something particularly interesting. The 1991 series Tokyo Love Story looks like a romance drama on the surface but the character Rika Akana actually represents very well the generation of urban women who emerged around the end and collapse of the bubble economy. She has a job and a life of her own and she actively expresses her feelings.
She is no longer the traditional kind of woman waiting for a man to decide her marriage and her life. The real conflict between her and Kanji is that the two of them understand love, marriage freedom, and the pace of life differently. In a sense, when Tokyo Love Story became a hit Japanese women were increasingly becoming independent modern urban individuals but society’s expectations around marriage family, and gender roles had not fully caught up. In other words, women had already stepped into modern society first but the old marriage script was still dragging them backward. This contradiction later became even more obvious as the bubble burst, the economy stagnated, and dual-income households increased and it only became more and more pronounced.
Then came the 2016 series The Full-Time Wife Escapist where the issue became even more direct the female lead played by Yui Aragaki simply enters into a contract marriage with the male lead you hire me to be your wife, so how much is cooking worth? How much is cleaning worth? Does housework count as labor or not? When Japan’s Cabinet Office later discussed the division of housework it even directly used this drama as an example. In the series, the husband acts as the employer and calculates a monthly salary for his wife’s housework. You see, a romantic comedy ended up turning into a living lesson in the economics of marriage.
Why did it resonate so strongly? Because traditional marriage loves to say one thing we’re family, why calculate everything so precisely? But once both spouses need to enter the labor market people suddenly realize that yes, you really do have to calculate it. To some extent, China today is going through a similar change except women’s labor-force participation in China was already relatively high in the past, people could still demand that men buy a home and support the family and have a stable income, but today, for an ordinary man to single-handedly pay for a home children, education, and retirement, this whole traditional provider role is becoming increasingly difficult to fulfill.
Meanwhile, women are also increasingly unable to say I’ll just find a man to support me someday. You can even observe a very visible phenomenon female ride-hailing drivers on the streets are becoming increasingly common and female food-delivery workers are no longer news either this is actually a highly symbolic change. Women’s obligation to earn money has increased while traditional female obligations have not decreased proportionally at the same time, men’s ability to support a family has declined while traditional male obligations have not decreased proportionally either. This makes things even more difficult. Men think I can barely afford to support myself so why are you still expecting me to be the head of the household by 1998 standards?
Women think, now that both of us clearly have to earn money why do you still think cooking and taking care of the children are my job once we get home? And so economic problems rapidly become gender problems. What are women really complaining about in the first place? Employment discrimination, the costs of childbirth housework, domestic violence, property, and childcare. What are men really complaining about? Housing prices, income, the cost of marriage bride price, career pressure, and social status. Look, talking about these things doesn’t it sound terribly academic? How should we design a universally accessible childcare system? Post that title on Douyin and even you wouldn’t want to click it.
When Structural Problems Become Traffic
But change it to: Why are women so materialistic these days? There comes the traffic. Or change it again: Why are Chinese men increasingly unworthy of Chinese women? Now you’ve got both sides coming in. Renyi He of the Chinese University of Hong Kong proposed a particularly interesting concept called Gender Equal Sexism. What does that mean? It means you might say something like of course I support gender equality but, uh, generally when the word “but” appears in a sentence that’s when the interesting part begins. But women today are already riding roughshod over men but feminists are really asking for privileges but why should only women be protected?
This kind of rhetoric is especially powerful because it does not openly say that gender inequality is desirable instead, precisely in the name of supporting “real equality” it reorganizes gender hostility. Of course, the same thing happens on the other side some female-oriented content on these platforms also compresses men from a structural position into a type of personality. Overconfident, repulsive, mama’s boy, too broke to be thinking about marriage. So both sides increasingly stop talking about how policy should change and instead discuss whether the other gender as a whole is fundamentally defective. This gives us a new way to understand Yang Li and also a new way to understand what happened downstairs at TF Entertainment.
How Platforms Amplify Conflict
Platforms do not need to resolve conflict between men and women the conflict itself is the product. Come on, Zhang Gousheng, you can do this. I finally waited until Director Wang came out on vacation. Once I finish setting my trap, it’ll be Wang down and Zhang up. Forget it, it’ll probably be a while before he gets here. I’ll take a break first. I’m exhausted in this heat, and I’ve only dug two centimeters. How could someone fall into something this shallow? Hey! Where’d he go? Where did he fall? First, let me tell everyone that I got injured a few days ago. There was this little puddle at our school. Then at noon, when I went to eat with my classmates, I accidentally stepped into this little puddle.
Just as I was about to step in it, I went, “Ahhh!” And then I fell, you know? After going through all of that, you may have already forgotten that this episode clearly started with a few teenage boys but now when we look at idols again the whole thing looks completely different. What do real-world heterosexual relationships involve? Mortgages, salaries, both sets of parents children, housework, property, fidelity responsibility, and who deletes whom on WeChat after the breakup. What do idols offer? Beauty, youth, gentleness, and the ability to sing they can say, “Thank you all for always staying with me” then you close the video, and that’s it
Withdrawal, Substitutes, and Division
this is a form of intimacy with extremely low costs and an extremely strong sense of control. There is an old concept in communication studies called a parasocial relationship. Researchers used an even more direct term Compensatory Romance compensatory romance. Researchers followed Chinese female fans for two years and found that identities such as “girlfriend fans” and “mom fans” actually provide a special emotional space allowing women, outside the pressures of real-world dating and marriage to reorganize their own desires and imagined forms of intimacy.
Even more interestingly, the terms Chinese female fans use for male idols are themselves quite chaotic husband, son, wife, daughter. Yes, even wife and daughter. Calling a male idol “wife” or “daughter” is as strange as Jing Tian asking Brother Sun to call her “Mom.” Mom! Niu Lai! Mom! Niu Lai! A feature of Chinese fandom culture is that all these labels can switch back and forth for the same idol without any requirement for logical consistency. Other common ones include baby, little one, little brother, big brother, sweetheart, good daughter, good son, and my girl.
One moment you want to marry him, the next you want to feed him. This means placing yourself and the male idol into an imagined romantic or family relationship. So why are women especially likely to consume male idols? I don’t think the answer is that Chinese women are more boy-crazy than women elsewhere. A better explanation is that when the relative cost of real-world intimacy rises the relative value of low-risk fantasy also rises. And fantasy consumption among Chinese men has not disappeared it has been directed more toward games, anime culture, female streamers, and virtual idols and now there are even AI girlfriends.
So China has ended up with a very strange outcome women’s fantasy objects are often turned into real-life male idols while men’s fantasy objects are increasingly turned into virtual women or platform-based interactive products. So capital eventually discovered that producing teenage male idols is really profitable so why does China have TFBOYS but has never had a truly equivalent TFGIRLS? Only now is the answer complete it is not the cause of gender conflict in China it is more like an X-ray what you are seeing is the structural transformation of real-world gender relations leaving its shadow on the entertainment market.
First, let’s be clear: Europe and America are not paradises for gender relations either. America has incels and the manosphere Andrew Tate, and backlash against MeToo. The political attitudes of young men and women are also diverging. But there is one difference in the United States many gender conflicts are reorganized into larger political camps. Conservative women and conservative men may stand together liberal men and feminists may stand together. What ultimately emerges is Democrats versus Republicans liberals versus conservatives, rather than always reducing everything to men versus women.
European welfare states, meanwhile, use childcare parental leave and labor protections to shift some of the conflicts of interest that would otherwise happen within couples onto institutions to resolve. Japan is even more interesting. Japan today still cannot be called a model of gender equality but one typical way Japan handles conflict between men and women is not necessarily by changing each other but by opting out. Not marrying, marrying later, not having children men turn to anime culture, women follow male idols men have their own girl idols and otaku culture women have their own Johnny’s, BL and otome games, with different groups staying in their own rooms doing their own thing. When did Japan’s adult film industry really take off?
During the bubble economy era. For those interested in this part of history I recommend watching The Naked Director starring Takayuki Yamada on Netflix. It’s fantastic. The series gives the adult film industry an entirely different meaning and can even make you feel a kind of elevation of human nature. Ahem, I’m getting off track. Back to the point in a sense, Japan never completely resolved gender conflict it simply allowed more and more people to choose then maybe we should just have fewer relationships with each other. What China is experiencing today is an even more extreme state Exit plus Conflict: on one side, people withdraw from real-world dating and marriage while on the other side, Douyin, Weibo, and Xiaohongshu keep pushing the two sides in front of each other.
You may originally have no interest at all in what people on the other side are doing but the algorithm insists on telling you: Shocking! This is what women have become today. Then the next post says: Come take a look men having a meltdown. So the two sides get to know fewer and fewer people from the other side in real life while online, they become increasingly familiar with “the other group.” This is actually very similar to the mechanism I discussed in my previous episode about chimpanzee civil war. What is truly dangerous for a society is when the people connecting both sides begin to disappear until eventually you no longer know a specific individual on the other side you only know the “them” described to you by the algorithm.
Men are no longer Zhang San, Li Si, or Wang Wu they become “Chinese men” in the mouths of “little fairies” women are no longer your college classmates, coworkers, and neighbors they become gold diggers in short videos. At that point, the two sides really do begin living in two different worlds. Now let’s return to Changjiang International what is on one side? A group of women spending money, time, and emotion to create a hugely valuable teenage male idol industry. What is on the other side? Some male streamers discover that mocking these women can also make money. And then something surreal happens.
The first business sells teenage boys to women. The second business sells mockery of those women to another group of men. In the end, these two businesses somehow meet beneath the same building and complete an offline crossover. This is one of the most dangerous feedback loops in China’s gender conflict today. In reality, the cost of relationships between men and women keeps rising and men and women begin entering their own emotional substitute worlds. The two cultural spaces become increasingly separated and each side understands the other less and less. Platforms discover that pushing the two sides into each other generates traffic and conflict further reinforces gender stereotypes ultimately making real-world relationships even more difficult.
Four Deeper Causes
Then the cycle repeats, intensifying the conflict even further in a downward spiral. So if we have to identify the deepest causes of today’s gender conflict I think at least four are especially important. First, family planning. It changed the numerical balance between men and women on an unprecedented scale while unexpectedly creating a generation of more capable urban women with more choices. At the same time, family planning had another, less obvious effect. The children of only children are now entering the marriage market and behind each partner is only a single direct chain of family responsibility. Expectations around eldercare, emotional support, and property are all concentrated on the only child.
Two people who grew up accustomed to having an entire family revolve around them must, as adults, simultaneously take on two sets of family responsibilities. Marriage therefore becomes more like a collision between two single-core families. This may also explain why the loneliest generation is instead more likely to emphasize the self in dating and marriage and find compromise more difficult. Second, economic decline. It dismantled the economic scaffolding that sustained the old gender division of labor men increasingly struggle to fulfill the traditional provider role alone while women increasingly have to shoulder responsibility for earning income. Third, insufficient welfare support. Children, elderly parents, and housework, costs that could have been socialized to a greater extent, are left inside the family forcing men and women into direct zero-sum negotiations.
Fourth, rights protection and exit mechanisms within intimate relationships. When the costs and risks of exit are high everyone becomes more cautious and more utilitarian in choosing the conditions under which they enter. When these four things overlap China ends up in a state of disconnection. Modern awareness of equal rights between men and women has already arrived but the traditional obligations of men and women have not completely disappeared. So women say, why do I have to work like a modern woman while also giving birth, raising children, and caring for the family like a traditional woman? Men say, why do I have to accept modern gender equality while also buying a home, earning money, and supporting the family like a traditional man?
You’ll notice that both sides are really saying the same thing why do the old obligations still belong to me? While the new rights belong to you. This is the core problem at the heart of China’s gender conflict today. It is not because one side is entirely made up of bad people but precisely because each side can find evidence in reality proving that they really are getting the short end of the stick so naturally the simplest answer becomes it’s all the other side’s fault. Then the platform stands nearby saying, yes, yes, exactly you’re right, insult them a little more and I’ll give you more traffic. In the end, we get an especially ironic world where the opposite sex in fantasy becomes increasingly perfect women have male idols who are forever gentle and handsome men have anime girls and AI companions who are forever young and obedient. But the opposite sex in real life increasingly looks like a cost, increasingly looks like a risk increasingly looks like a contract with extremely long terms unclear liability for breach, and no guarantee you can terminate it after signing.
What is truly worrying may not simply be that Chinese men and women increasingly dislike each other at the same time, they increasingly no longer need each other to satisfy their emotional needs yet they still have to cooperate with each other on life’s heaviest issues: housing, childbirth, eldercare, and family. And so we return to the area downstairs from TF Entertainment what truly collided that night on the surface, was a group of fangirls and a group of male streamers but what was really colliding behind them were two worlds created over the past several decades in China by population policy, dramatic economic change family institutions, gender norms and internet platforms working together.
